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ABSTRACT 
Vision-based navigation of autonomous vehicles primarily depends on the Deep Neural Network 
(DNN) based systems in which the controller obtains input from sensors/detectors, such as cameras 
and produces a vehicle control output, such as a steering wheel angle to navigate the vehicle safely 
in a roadway traffic environment. Typically, these DNN-based systems of the autonomous vehicle 
are trained through supervised learning; however, recent studies show that a trained DNN-based 
system can be compromised by perturbation or adversarial inputs. Similarly, this perturbation can 
be introduced into the DNN-based systems of autonomous vehicle by unexpected roadway 
hazards, such as debris and roadblocks. In this study, we first introduce a roadway hazardous 
environment (both intentional and unintentional roadway hazards) that can compromise the DNN-
based navigational system of an autonomous vehicle, and produces an incorrect steering wheel 
angle, which can cause crashes resulting in fatality and injury. Then, we develop a DNN-based 
autonomous vehicle driving system using object detection and semantic segmentation to mitigate 
the adverse effect of this type of hazardous environment, which helps the autonomous vehicle to 
navigate safely around such hazards. We find that our developed DNN-based autonomous vehicle 
driving system including hazardous object detection and semantic segmentation improves the 
navigational ability of an autonomous vehicle to avoid a potential hazard by 21% compared to the 
traditional DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system.  
 
Keywords: Roadway Hazard, Autonomous Vehicle, Deep Neural Network, Driving Model 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to the 2016 American automobile association report, 50,658 crashes occurred in the 
U.S. from the year 2011 to 2014 due to roadway hazards resulting in 9,805 injuries and 125 deaths 
(1). The roadway hazards, such as debris, are considered to be non-fixed and unexpected objects 
on the travel or driving lane of the roadway and include objects that have fallen from vehicles or 
have come from construction sites or littering. Given that the autonomous vehicle is considered as 
the future of surface transportation, its ability to detect debris or hazards and then navigate safely 
around them is crucial for avoiding potential crashes. Recently, such navigational task has been 
accomplished using Deep Neural Network (DNN). Typically, an autonomous vehicle perceives its 
surrounding roadway environment using sensors, and the software running in the vehicle 
determines the action to be taken based on the input from the sensors. Several types of sensors, 
such as vision-based sensor (e.g., Camera), LIDAR, and Radar are currently available for the 
perception task. Due to the cost-effectiveness of the vision-based sensor compared to the other 
types of sensors (e.g., LIDAR and Radar),  vision-based navigation becomes an attractive solution 
for autonomous vehicles (2)(3)(4). 
The recent development of DNNs, in particular, Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)(5), 
has improved vision-based navigation for autonomous vehicles significantly. After being trained 
and tested using a dataset collected by sensors, these CNN models are then deployed in 
autonomous vehicles to navigate the vehicle safely. For example, during training, the CNN-based 
end-to-end driving model maps a relationship between the driving behavior of humans using 
roadway images collected from cameras and the steering wheel angle (6)(7). Thus, the 
performance of autonomous vehicles primarily depends on the training dataset, meaning if a 
hazard that the CNN model is not trained on appears on the roadway, the autonomous vehicle 
driving model may produce an incorrect steering wheel angle and may cause a crash. A recent 
study shows that the autonomous vehicle navigation system may fail to navigate safely due to 
several reasons, such as Radar sensor failure, camera sensor failure, and software failure (8). This 
study addresses the situation where a well-trained driving model may fail due to unexpected 
hazards that may lead to unsafe navigation, and then explores the use of object detection and 
semantic segmentation (9) for mitigating the navigational problem in this hazardous condition. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The related work section explores the 
existing studies on autonomous vehicle navigation, state-of-art DNN-based autonomous vehicle 
driving models, and the limitations of the traditional DNN-based model. Then we introduce the 
method developed in this study for navigating an autonomous vehicle on a roadway with 
unexpected hazards. Furthermore, we validate our proposed method using three case studies: (i) a 
model trained using a dataset that includes hazards but without considering them as separate input 
features; (ii) a model trained on a dataset that considers hazards as separate input features and uses 
a distance measurement sensor and image segmentation; (iii) a model trained on a dataset that 
considers hazards as separate input features and only uses image segmentation. In the second and 
third case studies, we introduce a DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system to enhance the 
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ability of an autonomous vehicle to navigate safely in a hazardous environment. Then we present 
the experimental setup employed in this study. After that, we evaluate all the case scenarios and 
report the results obtained through our experiments, and finally, we discuss the conclusions and 
suggest the areas for future work.  
RELATED WORK 
This section reviews the previous research on hazard detection, DNN-based driving systems used 
in an autonomous vehicle, and the techniques for and the importance of object detection and image 
segmentation in addition to the limitations of using DNN in autonomous vehicles.  
 
DNN-based Autonomous Vehicle Driving Model  
DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving systems are rapidly evolving (7)(10). Not only software 
companies such as Waymo (Google) Uber, and Lyft are using the DNN-based systems for 
autonomous vehicles, but many car companies such as Tesla, Volvo, BMW, and Ford are currently 
working on DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving systems (11). In such systems, sensors like 
cameras, LIDAR, and Radar provide input to DNN models, such as Convolutional Neural Network 
(CNN)(5) or Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) (12), which then produce outputs such as steering 
wheel angle and velocity. For example, the autonomous vehicle architecture developed by 
NVIDIA, named DAVE-2, uses a CNN model which takes input from a camera and outputs a 
steering wheel commands for navigation (7), while Udacity autonomous vehicle driving 
architectures include both CNN-based (e.g., Autumn) and RNN-based (e.g., Chauffeur using CNN 
and RNN) (13). This study used a CNN-based driving model similar to DAVE-2 as it is the 
fundamental base of DNN-based autonomous vehicle systems.  
 
DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving systems, which are intrinsically software systems, 
can be error-prone and cause severe consequences if they do not function as intended. Several 
studies have shown the vulnerabilities of the existing DNN models (14)(15)(16)(17). For example, 
DNN-based image classification can be exploited by adding a small perturbation to an input image 
such that the DNN model misclassifies it as another category, a vulnerability recently confirmed 
by (18), which found that attackers can physically modify objects using a low-cost technique to 
cause classification errors in DNN-based vision systems. These perturbations can be introduced 
under widely varying distances, angles, and resolutions. For example, in (18) perturbations caused 
a DNN model to interpret a subtly modified physical stop sign as a speed limit of 45 mph sign. 
Similarly, the debris or roadblocks on the road can also compromise the autonomous vehicle 
driving system by producing incorrect steering wheel angles, potentially causing a fatal collision. 
These limitations prompted this study to evaluate the impact of unexpected hazardous 
environments on a DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system.   
 
Autonomous Vehicle Dataset  
Data are an important part of deep learning-based systems, and this study requires a dataset that 
supports (i) end-to-end driving systems (input: image; output: steering wheel angle), (ii) image 
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segmentation, and (iii) hazard detection. To find an appropriate one, we explore various existing 
datasets used by the autonomous vehicle community. The closest dataset provided by Udacity, 
which supports end-to-end data and image segmentation, but it does not provide the ground truth 
for hazards in the drivable lane (13). KTTI (19) and Cityscape (20) datasets also do not support 
hazard detection as ground truth data. The dataset matching our requirements the closest is the 
Lost and Found dataset (21), which contains the image as the input, and the yaw rate (angular 
velocity), but not the steering wheel angle required by this study, as an output. Since existing 
datasets do not fully meet our needs, after careful consideration, we have created our own dataset 
using simulation as described in the experimental setup section. 
 
DNN-based Object Detection and Segmentation 
Object detection and classification are core components of autonomous driving. By detecting and 
classifying the objects, the autonomous vehicle controller determines safe navigation for both path 
planning and route planning. If an autonomous vehicle is not able to detect unexpected hazards on 
the road, it will not be able to navigate safely, perhaps resulting in a crash. However, detecting 
these objects or hazards is a challenging task. While various sensors, such as Radar and LIDAR, 
can be used for accurate distance and velocity measurement, these sensors are relatively costly 
than camera sensor (21). Considering these limitations, vision-based sensors, such as camera, are 
being used on autonomous vehicles for the navigational task. With the recent development of 
DNNs, DNN-based object detection and semantic segmentation can be applied to detect these 
roadway hazards, making navigation of autonomous vehicles safer.  
 
Semantic segmentation is a technology that has been widely used in the computer vision 
area to divide an unknown image into different parts (22), can be applied to an image containing 
unknown objects. This technology is effective in providing the scenario depicted by an image, 
allowing the DNN to capture additional information about the dataset during training. There are 
three major types of semantic segmentation technologies: Region-based semantic segmentation 
(23)(24), Fully Convolutional Network (FCN)-based semantic segmentation (25)(26)(27) and 
Weakly-Supervised semantic segmentation (28)(29)(30). The region-based semantic segmentation 
provides segmentation based on the results of object detection, meaning it can be developed on 
any CNN model. The FCN-based semantic segmentation segments each pixel of the image, 
meaning it does not require extracting regions of the image and, thus, can be applied to arbitrary 
sizes of images. The weakly supervised semantic segmentation technology, which was developed 
to reduce the labeling cost of a large dataset (30), achieves semantic segmentation by exploiting 
annotated bounding boxes or image-level labels. While recent studies show that segmentation-
based navigation can improve navigational performance (31)(32)(33), none considers the 
navigation of autonomous vehicles in hazardous environments. Thus, by leveraging these DNN-
based models, we can detect hazards and then extract their semantic information from images 
obtained from the camera sensor of an autonomous vehicle.  The approach adopted in this study 
uses an FCN-based model as one such network is relatively small, yet the network yields fast 
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results (25). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that develops a DNN-based 
autonomous vehicle driving system focusing on unexpected roadway hazardous environments. 
METHOD 
In this section, we describe our approach for developing a safer autonomous vehicle driving system 
in a hazardous environment. This study uses DNN-based object detection and segmentation to 
create a corrected image, which is subsequently used by the autonomous vehicle driving system to 
predict the steering wheel angle. As presented in Figure 1, we develop a DNN-based autonomous 
vehicle driving system, which comprises of three DNN models. The first one is the DNN-based 
hazard detection and segmentation model, which detects the hazard and creates a segmented 
image. The second model is the hazard analysis and avoidance model, which fuses the segmented 
image with the original input image from the dashboard camera to make the autonomous vehicle 
driving model aware of the unexpected roadway hazards.  This model then analyzes the hazard 
and determines if the hazard should be ignored or considered as a threat for a potential crash using 
a threat factor (𝑇𝑓). The third model is the DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving model, which 
takes the fused image with hazard information and produces the steering wheel angle required to 
navigate the vehicle safely in an unexpected hazardous environment. We provide the detail 
description of these three models in the following subsections. 
 
FIGURE 1 DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system in an unexpected hazardous 
environment.  
 
DNN-based hazard detection and segmentation model  
For hazard detection and image segmentation, this study uses an FCN, which is a DNN-based 
image object detection and segmentation model (25). Figure 2 shows the structure of the FCN 
network used in our study. It takes an input of image size 400x600x3 and outputs a segmented 
image of the same size. We use a pre-trained network with a weight of VGGNet (34), which is a 
deep convolutional network for large-scale image recognition, and then we re-trained the model 
with our training dataset to classify the hazard and perform image segmentation. 
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FIGURE 2 FCN-based object detection and image segmentation model used in this study. 
 
Hazard analysis and avoidance model 
As shown in Figure 1, the image captured from the center dashboard camera first goes to the hazard 
detection and segmentation model, which provides an output of the detected object in addition to 
a segmented image. Then, this output is combined with the original image in the hazard analysis 
and avoidance model. In this study, we develop a hazard analysis and avoidance model based on 
the following equation:  
 
𝐼 = (1 −  𝑇𝑓) × 𝐼𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 + 𝑇𝑓  ×  𝐼𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 
where 𝐼 is the image used to predict the autonomous vehicle driving model; 𝐼𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 is the data 
from the center dashboard camera of the vehicle; 𝐼𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 is the segmented image of  𝐼𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  
containing the hazardous object detected and segmented; and 𝑇𝑓 is the threat value of the detected 
hazardous object or physical-world threat object. This threat value depends on the position of a 
detected object on a driving lane. If the object is dangerous to the autonomous vehicle, it will have 
a high threat factor, while a negligible threat object will have a lower threat factor. This threat 
value depends on the longitudinal and latitudinal distance from the autonomous vehicle. 
Depending on the hazardous object localization technique, we have used two procedures to 
determine the threat value: (ii) Procedure 1 - threat value determination using a distance 
measurement sensor (e.g., Radar); and (ii) Procedure 2 – threat value determination using image 
segmentation.  
 
Procedure 1 - threat value determination using a distance measurement sensor  
According to the first procedure, we measure the longitudinal distance (𝑙𝑥), and latitudinal distance 
(𝑙𝑦) of hazardous objects from the vehicle using a distance measurement sensor. If the vehicle is 
moving forward (longitudinal movement) or steering towards (latitudinal movement) the hazard 
the value of 𝑙𝑥 and 𝑙𝑦 decreases, respectively, and hence the hazard poses a higher threat of 
colliding with the vehicle. We consider the hazard as a threat to the vehicle if the hazard is within 
the longitudinal distance, 𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥 and latitudinal distance, 𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥. In our study, we use the Radar 
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sensor to measure the longitudinal distance and the latitudinal distance, and we measure the threat 
value using the following equations:  
 
𝑇 = √(
𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥 −  𝑙𝑥
𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥
)
2
+ (
𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 −  𝑙𝑦
𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥
)
2
 
 
𝑇𝑓 =  {
𝑇 − 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
               𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑦 ≤  𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 ; 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑥 ≤  𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥
0                                  𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑦 >  𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 ; 𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑥 >  𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥 
 
 
where, 𝑇𝑓 is the threat value corresponding to the hazardous object; 𝑙𝑥  and 𝑙𝑦 are the longitudinal 
distance and latitudinal distance in centimeters (cm) to the detected hazard from the vehicle, 
respectively; 𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the maximum longitudinal distance and maximum latitudinal 
distance, correspondingly, to consider the hazard as a threat; and 𝑇 is the threat value calculated 
from the longitudinal and the latitudinal distance. Then, the value of  𝑇 is normalized using the 
Min-Max normalization technique to obtain a value between 0 to +1 to determine the final threat 
value, 𝑇𝑓 (35)(36). In our experiment, we have selected 𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥  as 6000cm as this is the Radar’s 
maximum range of finding an object in our experimental setup, and 𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 is selected as 370cm 
which is the standard lane width of a roadway. We can visualize the relationship between the threat 
value, and longitudinal and latitudinal distance in Figure 3.  
  
FIGURE 3 Heatmap for the threat value based on the longitudinal and latitudinal distance 
of a hazardous object using Radar sensor data. 
 
Procedure 2 – threat value determination using image segmentation  
In this procedure, instead of using a Radar sensor, we use the segmented image to calculate the 
threat value. In this way, we can eliminate the use of any sensor data besides camera video feed. 
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After the image segmentation, we get the image coordinates (𝑥, 𝑦) of the hazard. As the camera is 
located at the center dashboard of the vehicle facing the front roadway, we measure the relative 
distance of the hazardous object in the image of size (ℎ, 𝑤), from the bottom center pixel, (ℎ,
𝑤
2
) to 
quantify the threat. We calculate the threat based on the location of the hazard in the segmented 
image using the following equation: 
 
𝑇𝑓 = 1 −  √
(𝑥 − ℎ)2 + (𝑦 −  
𝑤
2)
2
ℎ2 +  (
𝑤
2)
2  
 
where, 𝑇𝑓 is the threat value corresponding to the hazardous object located in the segmented image 
at location (𝑥, 𝑦) pixels, where (𝑥, 𝑦) is the pixel value closest to the bottom center pixel, (ℎ,
𝑤
2
), 
of the image. The value of ℎ and 𝑤 indicates the height and width of the image, respectively. As 
the camera of the vehicle is located at the center of the vehicle facing the front roadway, we subtract 
ℎ and 
𝑤
2
 values from the 𝑥 and 𝑦 values, respectively, to obtain the longitudinal and latitudinal 
distance of the hazard relative to the front center of the vehicle. As we described the equation 
above, we calculate the threat value. We can visualize the threat value in Figure 4, where the threat 
value decreases as the object moves from the center bottom pixel of the image. 
 
FIGURE 4 Heatmap for the threat value based on the location of hazard using pixel value 
from the segmented image. 
 
DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving model   
In our study, we have implemented an autonomous vehicle driving model similar to DAVE-2, an 
end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model (7). As shown in Figure 5, the network receives an 
input image of 400x600x3 pixels and produces a steering wheel angle as an output. This network 
includes one lambda layer, one normalization layer, five convolution layers (Conv2D), and four 
fully connected (FC) layers. We have used a 5x5 kernel (i.e., filters) and 2x2 stride (i.e., the 
Islam, Chowdhury, Li, Hu  10 
 
 
 
increment of kernel movement) in the first 3 Conv2D layers, and a 1x1 stride and a 3x3 kernel in 
the last two Conv2D layers. The entire network contains a total of 7,970,619 trainable parameters.  
 
FIGURE 5 CNN-based end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model used in this study. 
 
We train our driving model of an autonomous vehicle from the output of hazard analysis and 
avoidance model followed by the deployment to test the performance. After the training, our 
trained autonomous vehicle driving model is aware of hazardous objects on the roadway and 
produces a steering wheel angle to navigate safely around the hazard. 
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
In the experimental setup, we describe the data collection method, data preparation, and data 
augmentation; and finally, we train and validate the DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving 
model. The steps of our experiment setup are as follows:    
 
Data Collection 
For this study, we have used the robotics simulation platform Webots (37) to create the roadway 
environment with hazardous objects and to collect the data including the driving attributes of the 
camera image, timestamp, location, vehicle speed, and steering wheel angle. The following 
subsections describe the collection procedure of the dataset.    
 
Roadway Environment Setup  
The roadway built in the simulation consists of two lanes in each direction and 1663m in length 
with 16 curves (having 45 degree to 90 degree radius of curvature) and two intersections as shown 
in Figure 6(a). Six additional non-autonomous vehicles are placed randomly on the roadway. The 
hazardous debris, which includes five objects: rocks, wooden boxes, oil barrels, wooden pallets, 
and sections of pipe are created in Webots (37) and placed randomly on the roadway as shown in 
Figure 6(b). 
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FIGURE 6 Roadway environment setup for an autonomous vehicle with hazardous objects. 
 
Autonomous Vehicle Setup  
For collecting the data, the autonomous vehicle is equipped with three dashboard cameras, a front, 
left and right camera (as shown in Figure 7) and a Radar sensor. The data collected using these 
cameras are used to train the end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model. For example, as seen 
in Figure 8, the images collected by the left and right camera differ from the center camera. After 
training, the autonomous vehicle uses only a single front camera to navigate through the roadway, 
similar to the DAVE-2 system (7). In our developed driving model, we have used the Delphi ESR 
Radar sensor, which is commercially used in the existing autonomous vehicles (38). We have used 
the medium range mode configurations (horizontal field of view of 90 degrees and a maximum 
range of 6000 cm) of the Radar sensor in our autonomous vehicle (39).  We have also equipped 
the vehicle with three other Radar sensors in three directions (left, right and back side) for 
monitoring the near-by traffic condition and vehicles. These Radars sensors are also configured in 
the medium range mode.  
 
 
FIGURE 7 Camera placements in the autonomous vehicle (left, center, and right cameras). 
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FIGURE 8 Example of images collected by the three cameras in the autonomous vehicle (left, 
center, and right camera images (from left to right)) 
 
Data Preparation 
After collecting the data, we prepare the image dataset for training the end-to-end driving model 
by normalizing and resizing. As shown in Figure 9, the steering wheel angle output is normalized 
between the values of -0.5 and +0.5, where a positive value indicates the steering to the right, and 
a negative value represents steering to the left using linear transformation following this equation:  
 
𝜃𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑  =  −0.5 + max (0,  min (1.0 ,
𝜃𝑟𝑎𝑤− 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛
))  
 
where, 𝜃𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 is the normalized steering angle between -0.5 and +0.5; 𝜃𝑟𝑎𝑤 is the actual 
steering wheel angle (in radians) measured from the vehicle; 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥  and 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛 are the maximum and 
minimum steering wheel angle, respectively. We also normalize the input images for training, 
which is necessary to improve the DNN model performance (40). Normalization is also done on 
the input images. The red, green, and blue (RGB) channel values of the input images are 
normalized between the values of -1.0 and +1.0, and their top 200 pixels is cropped using a Lambda 
layer (as shown Figure 10) as top portion of the image is not necessary to predict the steering wheel 
angle, and doing so does not impact the steering wheel angle output of the driving model. For all 
data collected, we use an online image annotation tool, LabelMe (41), for labeling the hazardous 
object and segmented image. Using this tool, we have created the ground truth data for training 
the image segmentation model for detecting and segmenting the hazards in an image. 
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FIGURE 9 Example of a normalized steering wheel angle plot from the training dataset. 
 
FIGURE 10 Example of an original and cropped image in the training dataset. 
 
Data Augmentation 
To obtain satisfactory performance from the driving model, it is necessary to train the model on 
multiple training datasets. Using the techniques of data augmentation, we have created additional 
data from the existing data through affine transformation (42), specifically random rotation, 
random brightness change, and horizontal flipping of the images, to double the size of the dataset 
as shown in Table 1.  From our first simulation, we have collected 1390 images in total, and we 
have split the image dataset in training (i.e., 1112 images) and validation dataset (i.e., 278 images) 
as shown in column 2 of Table 1. Then we have doubled the dataset size (i.e., 2780 images) using 
data augmentation as presented in column 3 of Table 1. Among these 2780 images, 2224 images 
are used for training, and the remaining 556 images are used for validation. Among the 2224 
images used for training, 468 images contained hazards. Furthermore, we have collected 104 
images from a second simulation where all the images contained hazard. These 104 images are 
used to evaluate or test the driving model performance. 
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TABLE 1 Dataset description 
Dataset type Collected 
dataset size 
Dataset size after data 
augmentation 
Dataset size  1390 2780 
Training dataset size  1112 2224 
Validation dataset size 278 556 
Testing dataset size (all containing hazard) 52 104 
 
Model Training and Validation 
After the development of the end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model, we train it using the 
augmented dataset. This dataset is divided into two, 80% in a training set (2224 images as per 
Table 1) and the remaining 20% in a validation set (556 images as per Table 1). We then train 
three models for our evaluation:  
• Case 1:  A model trained on a dataset that includes hazards but without considering them 
as a separate input feature. 
• Case 2: A model trained on a dataset that considers hazards as separate input features and 
uses a distance measurement sensor and image segmentation. In this case, the threat value 
is determined using a distance measurement sensors (Radar in our case), following the 
Procedure 1 as described in the method section.   
• Case 3: A model trained on a dataset that considers hazards as separate input features and 
uses image segmentation. In this case, the threat value is determined using the image 
segmentation, following the Procedure 2 as described in the method section.   
 
For the training of the autonomous vehicle driving model, we have used Adam optimizer that can 
change the learning rate dynamically(43). The mean square error based loss function, a dropout 
rate of 0.5 in the last four FC layers, and L2 regularization are used to reduce overfitting and under-
fitting and to minimize training error (44). We use model checkpoints to stop the training when 
the validation loss is not decreasing over time (45). Figure 11(a) shows the performance of the 
model training for Case 1, where the training is stopped after 14 epochs because the model does 
not exhibit much improvement after 11 epochs. We observe no overfitting or under-fitting during 
the training. In Case 2, the model stopped training after 16 epochs (as shown in Figure 11(b)), and 
in Case 3, the model stopped the training after 15 epochs (as shown in Figure 11(c)) 
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FIGURE 11 Training and validation performance of the end-to-end driving model for Case 
1, Case 2, and Case 3 on the training and validation dataset. 
 
ANALYSIS RESULTS 
After training and validating the model using the dataset from the first simulation, we evaluate the 
trained end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model using the test dataset of 104 images (as 
depicted in Table 1). We have created this dataset of 104 images from a second simulation where 
all debris are placed in the middle of the driving lane, and we measure the predicted steering wheel 
angle for each test image. In this second simulation, first, we create the ground truth by manually 
driving the vehicle on the roadway. Then we deploy the trained end-to-end autonomous vehicle 
driving model for Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3. We then analyze the performance of the model for 
each cases using the following quantitative measures: root mean square error (RMSE) and mean 
absolute error (MAE), and a qualitative measure through visualization. 
 
Quantitative Results of Model Performance 
The quantitative results include the RMSE and the MAE, are measured by comparing the predicted 
steering wheel angle with the actual steering wheel angle (i.e., ground truth data). We define the 
RMSE and MAE as follows: 
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𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √
1
𝑁
 ∑(𝐺𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖)2
𝑁
𝑖=1
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1
𝑁
 ∑(|𝐺𝑖 −  𝑃𝑖|)
𝑁
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where N is the total number of images in the testing dataset; and 𝐺𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖 are the ground truth and 
predicted steering wheel angle, respectively, for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ image of the testing dataset. As shown in 
Figure 12, both the RMSE and MAE are higher for Case 1 than Case 2 and Case 3. A lower RMSE 
and MAE indicate that the predicted steering wheel angle is closely following the actual steering 
wheel angle or ground truth data related to steering wheel angle.  
 
FIGURE 12 Error measurement on the testing dataset. 
 
We measure the steering wheel angle prediction accuracy and improvement of Case 2 and Case 3, 
over Case 1. By comparing 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 of Case 2 and Case 3 with 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒1, we calculate the steering 
wheel angle prediction improvement based on the equation below:  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = (
| 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 − 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒1|
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒1
× 100)  %   
Based on our experiment, we found a 21% improvement in the steering wheel angle prediction of 
Case 2 over Case 1, and 18% improvement in the steering wheel angle prediction of Case 3 over 
Case 1. The results suggest that both Case 2 and Case 3 improve the autonomous vehicle 
navigation to avoid an unexpected hazard on the roadway.  
Qualitative Results for Driving Direction 
Figure 13 shows the qualitative results of our study on the autonomous vehicle driving direction. 
To obtain the qualitative measurement, we transform the steering wheel angle (-0.5 to +0.5) into a 
driving direction angle (-25 degrees to +25 degrees) using linear transformation. In Webots, the 
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steering wheel angle follows the Ackermann geometry, representing a linear relationship between 
steering wheel angle and driving direction (37)(46). The prediction accuracy can be presented 
qualitatively by observing the driving direction angle or angle of movement of the autonomous 
vehicle. For example, Figure 13 shows that the continuous steering wheel output of data from the 
time step of 64000 milliseconds (ms) to 72000ms window for ground truth, Case 1, Case 2, and 
Case 3. In the presence of a hazard on the roadway, the autonomous vehicle driving model is 
producing the output for maneuvering the autonomous vehicle. According to Figure 13, the 
autonomous vehicle is moving towards the left for each case. For example, in Case 1, at time step 
66000ms, the predicted driving direction is +5.2 degrees, causing the car to move closer to the 
hazard (represented here as a box) compared to Case 2 and Case 3. However, in Case 2 and Case 
3, the predicted driving direction is +11.7 degree and +9.28 degree, respectively, which is a value 
closer to the ground truth than in Case 1. Overall, the qualitative results indicate better accuracy 
prediction for Case 2 and Case 3 than for Case 1. 
 
FIGURE 13 Qualitative results of ground truth, Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3 of the driving 
direction. 
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Quantitative Results for Driving Direction 
Following the Frenet coordinate system, we have performed quantitative analyses of hazard 
avoidance. In a Frenet coordinate system, the longitudinal movement and latitudinal movement 
are represented in x-axis and y-axis, respectively (47). Instead of following the Frenet coordinate 
system for the performance evaluation, we have plotted the time step in the x-axis and latitudinal 
movement in the y-axis (see Figure 14) to show the deviation of latitudinal movement of an 
autonomous vehicle and how the vehicle avoids a hazardous object for different cases (as described 
in the ‘Model Training and Validation’ subsection) over the time. We analyze the trajectory of the 
autonomous vehicle and calculate the RMSE between the vehicle trajectory of each case and the 
ground truth. In Figure 14, we present the autonomous vehicle trajectories for all three cases from 
the time step 62000ms to 72000ms to show how accurately the vehicle following the ground truth 
trajectory data for each case to avoid the hazardous object. For Case 2, the vehicle trajectory 
produced from the autonomous vehicle driving systems is closely following the ground truth 
vehicle trajectory compared to Case 1 and Case 3. However, in all cases, i.e., Case 1, Case 2, and 
Case 3, the vehicle is able to avoid the hazard (Figure 14). In Case 1, the RMSE value was 0.52. 
On the other hand, the RMSE values for Case 2 and Case 3 are 0.07 and 0.23, respectively. We 
perform a statistical significance test (pairwise t-test) between the ground truth and each case 
separately at a 95% confidence interval. We find that Case 1 is significantly different from the 
ground truth at a 95% confidence interval. However, Case 2, which uses both image segmentation 
and a distance measurement sensor, and Case 3, which only uses the segmented image, are not 
significantly different from the ground truth. Thus, based on the statistical analyses of Case 2 and 
Case 3, we achieve the same level of performance using image segmentation, and not using any 
additional distance measurement sensor, i.e., Radar. 
 
FIGURE 14 Trajectory of the autonomous vehicle for ground truth, Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
Detecting unexpected hazards on a roadway is a crucial task for the safe operation of an 
autonomous vehicle. In this work, we have developed and evaluated a DNN-based driving system 
for autonomous vehicles in an unexpected hazardous roadway environment. First, we detect the 
hazard, and then using semantic segmentation, we extract the hazard information and perform data 
fusion to improve the navigation of an autonomous vehicle. This study makes the following 
contributions to the current body of research: (i) we evaluate the effect of the hazardous roadway 
environment on the DNN-based driving system of an autonomous vehicle; (ii) we develop a DNN-
based driving system for autonomous driving that can address an unexpected hazardous roadway 
environment and can navigate the autonomous vehicle safely through this environment. More 
specifically, we explore the object detection and semantic segmentation based deep learning 
models to address an unsafe navigational problem; (iii) we contribute a new dataset that can be 
used by the autonomous vehicle community to improve the driving model in unexpected hazardous 
roadway environment. Based on the analyses result, we conclude that our method improved the 
safety of the autonomous vehicle by 21% in terms of avoiding hazards, compared to a vision-based 
navigation system of autonomous vehicles having no hazard detection and segmentation as 
separate input features. Future work will include fusing the temporal and spatial information into 
the DNN-based model, potentially further improving the safety of autonomous vehicles operating 
in an unexpected hazardous roadway environment. 
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